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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

NO. 47810-2020

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

Minidoka County Case No.
CR34-19-858

)

V.

)

)

THOMAS MORGAN SOPER,

II,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

ISSUES
1.
Has Soper failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed a sentence of ten years, With ﬁve years ﬁxed, following his plea of guilty to felony DUI?

2.

Has Soper failed to

establish that the district court abused

its

discretion

by denying his Rule

35 motion for reduction of sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Law

enforcement responded to the scene of a vehicle

travelling in the center turn lane struck a

Ford vehicle

that

collision.

(PSI, p3.)

was stopped and waiting

p3.) Thomas Morgan Soper was in the Chevy van’s driver’s

seat; the

Ford

driver,

A Chevy van
t0 turn. (PSI,

a Witness, and

the

van passenger all identiﬁed Soper as having been driving or near the

When

(PSI, p.3.)

law enforcement spoke With Soper, he refused

identiﬁed himself only as “Tom.”
collision.

moved

(PSI, p.3.)

He

told

driver’s side ofthe vehicle.

t0 provide identiﬁcation

Soper denied driving the van

(PSI, p.3.)

law enforcement

that

at the

time 0f the

he was only in the driver’s seat because he

the vehicle after the collision; at one point, he told law enforcement the passenger

driving and later told police the passenger

would “take the blame.”

conﬁrmed Soper was driving at the time ofthe

and

collision

(PSI, pp.3, 40.)

was

The passenger

and provided his name to law enforcement.

(PSI, p.3.)

Law

enforcement discovered Soper’s driver’s license was suspended.

(PSI, p.3.)

After

being cited for driving without privileges and improper use of the center lane, Soper continued to

deny he had been driving and was arrested

for obstruction.

(PSI, p.3.) In the patrol vehicle,

enforcement noticed the smell 0f alcohol 0n Soper’s breath.

draw and transported Soper

for a blood

t0 a

medical center.

Ofﬁcers obtained a warrant

(PSI, p.3.)

threatened to

kill

an ofﬁcer, threatened to kick another ofﬁcer between the

and

kill

him.

to shoot

(PSI, p.3.)

Blood

Soper refused to

(PSI, p.3.)

participate in ﬁeld sobriety tests or provide breath samples. (PSI, p.3.)

testing revealed Soper’s

law

While

legs,

there,

Soper

and asked ofﬁcers

blood alcohol level was .266.

(PSI, pp.3, 44.)

The

state

charged Soper With felony DUI, misdemeanor driving Without privileges, and

misdemeanor providing
enhancement.

DUI.

(R., pp.58-63, 71-76.)

(R., pp.90-94.)

pp.121-23.)

false information to

The

law enforcement, along with a persistent Violator

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Soper pleaded guilty t0 felony

district court

sentenced Soper to ten years With ﬁve years ﬁxed. (R.,

Soper ﬁled a Rule 35 motion for reduction 0f his sentence, which the

denied. (R., pp.138—46.) Soper ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal. (R., pp.13 1-32.)

district court

ARGUMENT
I.

Soper Has Failed To
A.

Show That The

Court Abused

District

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Soper asserts that the

district court

abused

its

discretion

When it sentenced him to

with ﬁve years ﬁxed following his plea of guilty to felony DUI. (Appellant’s
has shown no abuse of discretion.

The

district

ten years

brief, pp.3-5.)

Soper

court properly considered the facts and

circumstances 0f the case, and the objectives of criminal sentencing. The district court reasonably
exercised

its

discretion

when it imposed a sentence often years with ﬁve years ﬁxed, given

Soper’s

criminal history and the facts surrounding the collision giving rise t0 this case.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence

0f demonstrating that

it is

is

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d

614, 615 (2001) (citing State V. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

Whether a lower court abused
asks “whether the

its

trial court: (1)

In evaluating

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four—part inquiry,

Which

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within

the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable t0
the speciﬁc choices available t0

V. Herrera,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise 0f reason.”

164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg

Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

V.

m

MV Fun Life,

163

The

C.

District

T0 bear
that,

Court Did Not Abuse

Sentencing Discretion

Its

the burden of demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View 0f the

sentence

facts, the

was

excessive.

must

establish

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met

this

burden,

the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period

of actual incarceration. State

m,

144 Idaho

at

V. Bailey,

161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

T0

was

establish that the sentence

appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence

t0

excessive, the

was appropriate

accomplish the sentencing goals ofprotecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

Faiell, 144 Idaho
substitute

its

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference t0 the

trial

View of a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might

Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).

The

district court

m

judge, this Court Will not

V.

differ.”

9

Stevens, 146 Idaho

properly considered the goals of

sentencing—protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution—as well as the
sentencing factors set forth in Idaho

Code

§

0f the offender, and protection of the public

The sentence

is

19-2521 and “the nature 0f the offense, the character
interest.” (TL, p.16,

L.17 — p.17, L.6.)

reasonable in light of Soper’s criminal history, Which the district court

recognized as an “obvious” aggravating factor, given the “lengthy record and the grave risk to
society.”

(TL, p.17, Ls.7-1

1;

p.17, L.17

—

p.18,

L20.) Soper’s criminal record includes several

charges in Texas between 1979 and 1989 With various indeterminate dispositions, including ﬁve

DUIS between 1985 and 1986 Without
pp.4-6.) In Idaho, Soper

dispositions and a felony

DUI

amassed numerous charges demonstrating

conviction in 1989.

(PSI,

his apparent unwillingness to

follow court orders, including six convictions for contempt 0f court, ﬁve convictions for failing t0

purchase a driver’s license, three convictions for Violating a protection order, and a probation
Violation.

DUIs

in

(PSI, pp.6-10.)

Soper also accrued several

DUI

convictions, including

1998 and 2001 and felony DUIs in 2002, 2004, and 201

sentenced to retained jurisdiction 0n his 2002 felony DUI.

(PSI, pp.8, 10-1

1.

(PSI, p.12.)

2009, Soper committed another

DUI

in

2011 and was incarcerated

Thereafter, he committed the underlying offense.

(PSI, p.12.)

for the period

until his release in late 2016.

The

district court

noted that

by a drunk

The sentence

failure to

comply with court

is

orders, including while

on probation, the

also reasonable in light 0f the circumstances surrounding the underlying

the district court noted, “[t]his

4:45 in the afternoon 0n a workday.

An

was 4:54

p.m., a

work

accident with a citizen

vehicle, accident, .266

by somebody With

felony DUIS.” (TL, p.18, Ls.7-10.) Further, Soper’s driver’s license
(TL, p.20, Ls.8-1

1.)

While

in custody,

testing, threatened the ofﬁcers,

was suspended

at the time.

Soper refused to cooperate with ﬁeld sobriety tests or breath

and then asked them

the passenger, refused tests, and threatened ofﬁcers.

his employer, claiming in the

the

van anyway.

PSI

that

(PSI, p.4.)

t0 shoot him.

(PSI, p.3.) Rather than accept

in Violation

(E PSI, pp.3-4, 40.)

Later,

blamed

Soper blamed

he told his boss he’d been drinking and his boss told him to

However,

his

was suspended, unaware Soper had been

work van

[BAC]

three prior

responsibility for his actions, Soper refused to provide his identiﬁcation, denied driving,

license

driver

reasonably concluded that incarceration was necessary.

district court

drive the

for

of time you’re incarcerated.” (TL, p.19, Ls.2-3.) Given Soper’s signiﬁcant history

0f DUIS and demonstrated

at

Soper was

While on probation

incarceration offered protection t0 society: “It kept any citizens from being hit

As

1.)

he committed his second DUI. (PSI, p.12.) After being released 0n that charge in

that offense,

offense.

misdemeanor

employer was unaware

drinking, and

of company policy. (PSI, pp.15-16.)

that Soper’s driver’s

unaware Soper had a passenger

in

The presentence

investigator noted Soper’s failure t0 take responsibility for his actions.

Ultimately, the presentence investigator

(PSI, p.19.)

recommended

incarceration

Where Soper

could pursue treatment in a secure environment: “Due to his dishonesty in this investigation, his
reluctance to take full responsibility for the instant offense, and the fact this

DUI conviction;

when

his fourth felony

[Soper] presents a signiﬁcant risk to the community, and he does not appear t0 be

a suitable candidate for

discretion

is

it

community

supervision.” (PSI, p.20.)

The

district court

did not abuse

followed that recommendation.

Soper argues that the

district court

abused

discretion in light of his recognition that he

its

has a drinking problem, the sale of his vehicle, his support system, and his acceptance into
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)

court.

the

PSI and

p.1

1,

—

at sentencing.

(E

The

district court

considered the mitigating factors raised in

Soper addressed his drinking problem.

T11, p.17, Ls. 12-16.)

DUI

(T12,

Ls.1-6; PSI, p.17.) Soper told the court he sold his vehicle. (TL, p.10, Ls.15-19; p.13, L.24

p.14, L.3.)

17.)

its

The

Soper also mentioned his support system.

possibility of DUI Court

L.13; p.14, Ls.1 1-17;

ﬂ alﬁ

would not be sufﬁcient

also discussed.

(E

L.24 — p.15, L.9; PSI, pp.13,

T11, p.10, Ls.4-14; p.12,

L.14 — p.13,

PSI, p.18.) However, the district court concluded that

to ensure that

0f society

at risk.

abused

sentencing discretion.

its

was

(Tr., p.14,

Soper would not commit another
Therefore, Soper has failed t0

(Tr., p.19, Ls.3-10.)

DUI

court

DUI or put other members
show

that the district court

II

Soper Has Failed To

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Rule 35 Motion For Reduction
A.

Its

Discretion

When It Denied His

Of Sentence

Introduction

Soper asserts that the
for reduction

district court

0f sentence. (Appellant’s

abused

its

discretion

brief, pp.5-6.)

The

When it denied his Rule 35 motion

district court

properly determined that

Soper had not provided

new

imposed. Therefore, the

Standard

B.

information on which the district court could reconsider the sentence

district court

did not abuse

its

by denying Soper’s motion.

Of Review

“A motion

for reduction 0f sentence

under I.C.R. 35

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State

Where

381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015).
“the defendant

discretion

must show

a sentence

is

V.

is

Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d

neither illegal nor excessive

that the sentence is excessive in light

subsequently provided to the

district court in

essentially a plea for leniency,

When pronounced,

of new or additional information

support 0f the motion.” State V. Burggraf, 160 Idaho

177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).

“An

appeal from the denial 0f a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the

underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Huffman, 144 Idaho

P.3d

C.

at

at

203, 159

840

Soper Failed To

Show His

Sentence

Was

Excessive In Light

Of New

Information

Along with his Rule 35 motion, Soper submitted an afﬁdavit in Which he expressed concern
that the district court “inappropriately focused”

disposition 0r

The

were declined

district court

not supported by
First, the

for prosecution,

0n

his charges

from Texas, most 0f which had no

and concern for his health

in prison. (R., pp. 143-44.)

reviewed Soper’s afﬁdavit and properly determined that the Rule 35 motion was

new

information. (R., p.146.)

PSI clearly reﬂected

that

many of the Texas

charges had n0 disposition or were

not ultimately prosecuted. (PSI, pp.4-6.) The district court speciﬁcally acknowledged that

0f the charges were without dispositions, including numerous DUIs.
L.5; p.18, Ls.15-24.)

Second, the

district court

(E

Tr., p.17,

was aware of Soper’s age and

many

L.20 — p.18,

health, including

that

he has Hepatitis C. (PSI, p.16;

facts

When imposing

sentence: “you

Tr., p.15,

L.7

p.16, L.3.)

It

speciﬁcally considered these

d0 have health issues” and “you are

people are getting older and they go to prison, but
(Tr., p.19,

—

I

think you

Ls.12—17.) Thus, Soper failed to provide any

motion and has failed to show 0n appeal

older,

and

it is

sad

when

may well get out and have time left.”

new

that the district court

information to support his Rule 35

abused

its

discretion

When it denied

his motion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment 0f the

district court.

DATED this 30th day of November, 2020.

/s/

Kacey L. Jones

KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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